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 Since 1999 a multilateral effort termed the Nile Basin Initiative has been underway 
among the Nile riparians to explore opportunities for maximizing the benefits of the river’s 
waters through cooperative development and management of the basin.  However, to date there 
has been virtually no explicit discussion of the economic value of cooperative water resources 
development.  We believe that a serious discourse among Nile riparians about the economics of 
Nile cooperation is both inevitable and desirable, and that this discourse will not diminish the 
importance of environmental, social, or cultural issues that new infrastructure on the Nile will 
entail.  To initiate such a discussion, in this paper we present the results of the first economic 
model designed to optimize the water resources of the entire Nile basin.  Total (potential) annual 
direct gross economic benefits of Nile water utilization in irrigation and hydroelectric power 
generation are estimated to be on the order of US$7–11 billion. This does not account for the 
costs of building or operating the infrastructure.  
 
Key words: water conflicts, Nile basin, cooperation, economic optimization  
 
Please Cite as: 
Whittington, Dale, Xun Wu, and Claudia Sadoff. Water Resources Management in the Nile Basin: The 
Economic Value of Cooperation, Water Policy, 7(3), 2005.  
 Introduction 
It is now part of the international water resource community’s lexicon to argue that 
“water is an economic good”. Though this phrase means different things to different people, it 
clearly calls for recognition that water has an economic value and that this value must be a 
central consideration in the management of water resources. Since 1999, a path-breaking 
multilateral effort termed the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) has been underway among the Nile 
riparians to promote cooperation and explore opportunities for maximizing the benefits of the 
river’s waters through cooperative development and management of the basin system. Yet to 
date there has been virtually no explicit discussion of the economic value of cooperative water 
resource development from a basin-wide perspective. We believe that a serious discourse among 
Nile riparians about the economics of Nile cooperation is both inevitable and desirable (and in no 
way diminishes the importance of the environmental, social, or cultural issues that new 
infrastructure development on the Nile will entail). To initiate such a discussion, we present the 
results of the first economic model designed to optimize the water resources of the entire Nile 
Basin. 
 If the countries of the NBI are successful in launching cooperative basin-wide 
development and management schemes, this will represent a water management enterprise of 
historic proportions. Although the Nile south of Aswan is currently one of the least developed of 
the major international rivers of the world, the river system offers numerous opportunities for 
developments that would facilitate the management of Nile waters. Multipurpose dams on the 
Blue Nile in Ethiopia and elsewhere in the Blue Nile watershed could, for example, manage the 
Blue Nile flood and enable water resources managers to mitigate both the considerable inter-year 
and intra-year variations in the flow of the Blue Nile. The construction of such dams could 
generate hydropower income for Ethiopia and positive downstream externalities for Sudan and 
Egypt in terms of drought, flood and sedimentation control. Such control structures could also 
allow water managers to operate the system in such a way that the total flow of water available to 
the riparians would increase. 
 On the White Nile, over-year storage in the Equatorial Lakes (Lake Victoria, Albert and 
Kyoga) and perhaps small water control structures on the tributaries feeding Lake Victoria, could 
provide hydropower generation and water supply for the White Nile riparians, especially 
Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. A major unanswered question on the White Nile is whether the 
Jonglei Canal Project will be finished and, if so, what form it will take1. Although variations in 
the flow of the White Nile are far less dramatic than in the Blue Nile, management of these 
waters would still provide positive downstream externalities in terms of drought, flood and 
sedimentation control. 
 For several decades, individual riparians have contemplated a variety of plans for the 
types of water control infrastructure projects described above (Whittington, 2004). More 
recently, as part of the NBI, investment planning has begun to be examined from a more 
cooperative, regional perspective. If cooperative investment projects are agreed and undertaken, 
the riparians could move closer to achieving system-wide, economically optimal management of 
the shared resources of the Nile. Whatever set of projects is agreed upon and eventually carried 
                                                 
1 The Jonglei Canal was conceived to run through the Sudd wetlands of the White Nile in Southern Sudan in order 
to conserve some of the estimated 50% of flow reduction attributed to wetlands consumption and evaporation in the 
marshes each year. [We don’t want to sound as if we think the Sudd water consumption is a deadweight loss] 
Despite serious environmental concerns, construction of the Canal began in 1978 as a joint Sudanese–Egyptian 
effort. As a consequence of the security situation in Southern Sudan, the project was suspended in 1984 with 250 km 
of the proposed 360 km canal completed. Concerns have been raised regarding the social and environmental impact 
of the Jonglei Canal. 
out by the riparians, however, will signal the end of an historic period of Nile investment 
planning by putting in place the physical infrastructure that will allow the riparians collective 
control of the flow of Nile waters. 
These investments will usher in an era of Nile management in which the waters of the 
Nile can be delivered wherever and at whatever time the collective political leadership of the 
riparian countries decides. This new era of Nile water management will not be focused on 
investment planning and the construction of new projects, but on management questions: 
deciding how to use the waters of the Nile to maximize their benefits to different users in 
different riparian countries. The challenge will not be to control the Nile waters, but to determine 
how they should be managed to ensure their most beneficial use. This new era of Nile water 
resources management will pose problems quite different from the construction of the 
engineering works of the first period of Nile water management. Instead of looking for ways to 
augment supply, water resource managers will need to find ways to use existing supplies more 
wisely in order to maximize benefits, promote economic growth and alleviate poverty in the Nile 
Basin2. Using the economic optimization model presented in this paper, we look ahead to the 
challenges of this new era of Nile management. We examine issues that will inevitably arise 
concerning the economic forces at play in water management decisions and the implications they 
will have for the economic value of water in the Nile Basin. 
 This paper is divided into five sections. In the next, second section of the paper we briefly 
review the concept of the “economic value of water”, and make the distinction between the 
economic value of water to a particular user (user value) and the economic value of water within 
                                                 
2 An important corollary question is how to share these benefits among riparian countries in an equitable manner. 
We intend to examine this question in a future paper. 
a river basin system (systems value). We also discuss four economic “pressures” on the 
economic value of water in the Nile system that arise from a combination of interrelated physical 
and institutional factors and present some preliminary information on the magnitude of these 
different influences in the Nile basin. 
  In the third section we present the economic optimization model developed to analyze 
the economic benefits of cooperation in the Nile Basin; we also discuss its limitations. The fourth 
section presents the main results of this model. In the fifth and concluding section of the paper, 
we summarize our findings and offer some preliminary lessons about the economic value of 
water in the Nile basin. 
 
Background: two concepts of the “economic value of water” and four economic 
“pressures” at play in the Nile system 
 In the context of river basin management, there are two notions of the “economic value of 
water” that are both conceptually correct and commonly confused (Sadoff, Whittington and 
Grey, 2002). The first, which we term “user value”, is the idea that water has economic value to 
a particular user at a specific location and point in time, such as a household with a private 
connection using water for domestic purposes, or a farmer abstracting water for irrigation. The 
economic user value of water is the amount of money a user will be willing to give up to obtain 
more water and it will be determined both by the use to which this water will be put and the 
amount of money the user has. This definition of the economic value of water to a user is not 
based on some abstract notion that water is intrinsically desirable, but is fundamentally 
determined by its transaction value in a world of scarcity. 
It is difficult to generalize about the economic value of water to different users in 
different locations because both the intended uses of water and users’ incomes differ in different 
times and locations. Information on the current economic value of water to different types of 
users in different locations in the Nile basin is not available; it is even harder to estimate what 
such values will be in the future. However, evidence clearly indicates that municipal and 
industrial users typically have the highest economic values of water (Briscoe, 1996). The 
economic value of water in irrigated agriculture is much less. How much a farmer is willing to 
pay for water for irrigation depends on the crop being cultivated, the amount of rainfall, the 
prices of agricultural products, the prices of other inputs such as fertilizer and labor and other 
factors, but it is typically in the range of US$0.01–0.25 per cubic metre. The economic value of 
water for large-scale irrigation of cereal crops such as wheat or rice is at the low end of this 
range. The economic value of water for the irrigation of high-value fruits and vegetables is 
occasionally at the high end of this range, but depends to a large extent on market conditions and 
transportation costs of delivering produce to market. 
 The economic value of water to an individual need not, however, depend only on whether 
an individual actually abstracts water for use in some “economically productive” activity or for 
final consumption. People may well be willing to exchange scarce resources or money to leave 
water in its natural state in the environment. In this case water “generates” economic value for 
people by doing what it is already doing, sustaining natural ecological systems. People may 
value water in its natural state because this enables them to harvest certain products and wildlife 
(e.g. fish) from the ecosystem. For example, many people living near the Sudd swamps in Sudan 
harvest fish and graze their cattle on the grasses sustained by the retreating waters of the annual 
floods on the White Nile. For them water in the natural environment has economic value, 
although their willingness to pay for these ecological services must be very low, simply because 
their incomes are minimal. At the other extreme, some Europeans might be willing to pay 
substantial amounts of money to maintain the current hydrological regime of the Sudd swamps in 
order to sustain the migratory bird life that winters there and summers in Europe (Whittington & 
McClelland, 1992). 
 Individuals may also be willing to pay to leave Nile water in its natural state, not because 
they want to fish or preserve bird life that they may some day enjoying seeing, but simply to 
preserve a natural environment for its own sake, because it is the “right” or moral thing to do. 
This “existence” or “non-use” value is also a component of the true economic value of water if 
people are willing to sacrifice (or pay) to preserve water in the natural environment. Individuals 
who derive economic value from the preservation of Nile water in its natural state might be 
willing to pay to avoid the flooding of the canyons of the Blue Nile gorge by a series of 
reservoirs, in part perhaps to preserve the biological diversity and genetic resources that exist in a 
largely undeveloped natural habitat. The waters of the Nile can thus create economic value to 
individuals living far outside the boundaries of the watershed. Typically individuals’ motivations 
for preservation would represent a combination of both use and non-use values. 
 The second notion of the “economic value of water” incorporates the first, but takes a 
broader, systems perspective. This “systems value” or “shadow value” of water is defined as the 
total value generated by water within the river system – the sum of all benefits and costs to the 
riparians as a whole. Rather than asking what the value of water would be to a specific user, we 
attempt to ascertain the aggregate value of water to all of the inter-related users in the river 
system. From the systems perspective, we look at how changes in water availability – perhaps 
caused by changes in the water management strategy for a river basin – would affect all water 
users and hence the cumulative value of water in the system. The economic value of water from 
a systems perspective will be different from that of a single user because of the physical 
interdependencies of water use in a river basin that result in both positive and negative 
externalities. It is the concept of the economic value of water from a systems perspective that 
allows us to estimate the economic value of cooperation in an international river basin. 
 The economic value of water in the Nile Basin from this second, systems perspective will 
be determined by the interactions and magnitude of several different relationships, including the 
size of the evaporation and seepage losses, the hydroelectric power generation potential at 
different sites and the magnitude of the agricultural user values in different locations. These 
factors, coupled with the physical structure of the river basin network, create four principal 
“economic pressures” that affect how the water resources system should be managed and 
operated to maximize the system-wide economic benefits. We next discuss these four “economic 
pressures” and present estimates of some of the data that will determine their relative magnitude 
in the Nile system. Some of these data depend upon what projects are assumed to be in place and 
in operation in the Nile Basin, how they are operated and how much water is withdrawn by the 
riparian countries. For these illustrative calculations, we assume that the water withdrawals are at 
current levels and that a full set of Nile infrastructure projects is in place (Table 1)3. []  
Economic pressure no. 1: “Withdraw water for irrigation as far upstream as possible – before 
you lose it through evaporation and seepage” 
 As Nile water flows north toward the Mediterranean, much is lost from evaporation and 
seepage. For each cubic metre of water that leaves Lake Tana in Ethiopia, about 40% is lost by 
                                                 
3  This list of infrastructure projects is derived from existing proposals; it is not our recommendation for the “best” 
set of infrastructure projects for the Nile basin. 
the time it reaches the Mediterranean (assuming none is withdrawn for irrigation along the way). 
In some stretches of the river, evaporation and seepage losses are larger than in other places and 
in the southern reaches of both the White and Blue Niles rainfall in part compensates for 
evaporation and seepage losses. Seepage losses in one stretch may enter the groundwater aquifer 
along the river and contribute to in-stream flows downstream. But from Khartoum north, the Nile 
flows through severe desert and the net evaporation and seepage losses are substantial. 
Figure1 shows the proportion of a cubic metre of water starting at Lake Tana that remains 
at different points along the Blue and Main Niles. Figure 2 shows similar information for a cubic 
metre of water starting at Lake Victoria and travelling down the White and Main Niles. The 
losses experienced include average evaporation from major reservoirs, both existing and 
proposed. The evaporation losses amount to 1–2% of the flow along each stretch north of 
Khartoum. Evaporation losses from the Sudd swamps and the Aswan High Dam Reservoir are 
particularly severe, constituting almost 50% and 15% of the entering flows, respectively. 
 From an economic perspective, if there were no other countervailing pressures, one 
would want to withdraw water for consumptive uses such as irrigation and municipal water 
supply before it flowed downstream, because this strategy would minimize evaporation and 
seepage losses. In other words, ceterus paribus, there is more water to use if it is used upstream 
rather than downstream, so economic efficiency would dictate that it be used upstream. 
Economic pressure no. 2: “Withdraw water for irrigation as far downstream as possible in order 
to take full advantage of hydroelectric power generation facilities” 
 Hydropower is a non-consumptive water use and thus it is advantageous from an 
economic perspective to let each cubic metre flow through as many hydropower generation 
facilities as possible before it is withdrawn for consumption. This second economic pressure 
would dictate that, ceterus paribus, consumptive uses should occur downstream so that water 
flows through as many hydropower generation facilities as possible. One of the opportunity costs 
of withdrawing water upstream is therefore the foregone hydropower generation potential from 
all hydropower facilities downstream of that consumptive use that could have been obtained if 
the water had not been withdrawn. 
 The magnitude of hydropower generation at each point in the system is largely a function 
of two factors: (1) the quantity of water passing through the turbines and (2) the net head at each 
hydroelectric power generation site. Figures 3 and 4 show the average annual flows passing 
through the existing and some potential hydroelectric power facilities on the Blue and main Niles 
and White and main Niles, respectively. The flow of water passing through the potential 
hydroelectric power facilities on the Blue Nile increases steadily as the Blue Nile gathers 
volume, peaking at the Ethiopian–Sudanese border (at the proposed Border Dam). Releases from 
the Aswan High Dam are higher even after accounting for evaporation and seepage losses 
because the flow of the White Nile has augmented the flow of the Blue Nile at Khartoum. 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the average net head at each existing and some potential 
hydropower facilities along the Blue and main Niles and the White and main Niles, respectively. 
As shown, the net heads available on the upper reaches of the Blue Nile are much larger than 
those at sites on the Blue Nile in Sudan or even at the Aswan High Dam Reservoir. The net 
heads on the upper reaches of the White Nile are also large, but considerably less than on the 
Blue Nile in Ethiopia. 
 Figure 7 shows the monetary value created by a cubic metre of water flowing through 
hydroelectric power turbines at each of the sites along the Blue and main Niles, assuming each 
kilowatt-hour has an economic value of US$0.08. The economic value of hydropower created 
per cubic metre is highest upstream on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia owing to the large net heads at 
Lake Tana and Karadobi. The cumulative value generated by a cubic metre of water flowing 
downstream in the Blue Nile does not increase much after the Border Dam because the net heads 
at the subsequent downstream reservoirs (Roseires, Sennar and Aswan High Dam) are not great 
and substantial evaporation and seepage losses are incurred along the way. Figure 8 shows the 
cumulative value of the hydropower generated by a cubic metre of water flowing downstream on 
the Blue and main Niles. 
Figures 9 and 10 present the results of similar calculations for the White Nile. Existing 
studies suggest that there are six potential power station sites between Lake Victoria and Lake 
Kyoga, with capacity ranging from 150–350 MW. For a cubic metre of water flowing from Lake 
Victoria, the economic value of hydropower generated at Aswan High Dam only accounts for a 
small fraction of the total value because of the substantial evaporation and seepage losses in both 
the Sudd area and the dam itself. 
Economic pressure no. 3: “Store water upstream to reduce evaporation losses” 
 Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the importance from a systems perspective of minimizing the 
economic losses associated with evaporation losses at Aswan. As noted above, one way of doing 
this is to use water upstream. Another approach is to reduce storage in the Aswan High Dam 
Reservoir by moving storage upstream into the potential Blue Nile Reservoirs and the Equatorial 
Lakes. For an equivalent amount of storage, evaporation losses upstream are reduced because (1) 
volume-to-elevation relationships are more favorable at the upstream reservoir locations and (2) 
evapotranspiration is lower at the more humid upstream sites (Guariso & Whittington, 1987). 
Economic pressure no. 4: “Withdraw water where its user value is greatest” 
 The economic benefits from water use will be greatest when water is used by those who 
use it most productively, i.e. those with the highest user values. At this time not enough is known 
about the economic value of water to users to make any definitive statements about where in the 
Nile Basin user values of water will be highest. However, four relationships will almost certainly 
hold. First, the initial units of water that a riparian country receives have the potential to be the 
most valuable. Users will derive more value per unit of water when it is scarce than when it is 
abundant, because there is generally a limit to the amount of water that will be used in the most 
highly productive sectors, i.e. household and industrial consumption. Initial units of water should 
be allocated to their most productive uses, while subsequent units of water should be allocated to 
uses of decreasing productivity. Riparian countries with little current access to water may still 
have opportunities to expand high-value uses that have already been fully exploited by countries 
with abundant supplies. 
 Second, those countries that have the most economically sound water resource 
management policies, practices and institutions, will be likely generate the highest user values 
for water. Countries that are able to devise and implement institutional arrangements to charge 
water users prices that reflect scarcity values, for example, are much more likely to foster 
economically efficient water use (and put water to high-value uses) than countries that do not. 
Thus, the highest user values of water in the Nile Basin will not simply be the result of 
technological, economic and climatic factors, but also of the water resource policies and 
practices adopted by the riparian countries themselves. Because policies change, the relative 
economic value of water to different users in the basin is best viewed as dynamic. As discussed 
below, this insight is a key to unlocking the economic potential of the Nile’s water resources. 
 Third, those countries with economically sound water-related sectoral policies will also 
be more likely to generate higher use values for water. Agricultural policies that promote the 
production of high value crops and water-efficient farming methods, infrastructure policies that 
enable market access for high value agricultural products, and industry or service sector policies 
that encourage high value production with moderate or minimal water requirements will all 
increase the user value of water in a country. 
Fourth, the economic value of leaving water in a free-flowing river to preserve natural 
ecosystems and to provide recreational opportunities will grow over time. The critical 
environmental assets at risk from Nile water management are the canyons of the Blue Nile gorge 
in Ethiopia and the immense freshwater swamps on the White Nile in Sudan. Today the 
environmental and aesthetic values associated with free-flowing stretches of the Nile will seem 
of secondary importance to many Nile riparian countries. Yet experience suggests that the 
economic value of these environmental assets will increase; even today they may have 
surprisingly high values for ecotourism and debt-for-nature swaps. 
Balancing economic pressures in a systems context: the Nile economic optimization model 
(NEOM) 
The Nile economic optimization model (NEOM) provides a framework for integrating 
hydrological and economic information in order to consider jointly the effects of the four 
economic pressures described above. It is formulated as a non-linear, constrained optimization 
problem designed to determine the annual pattern of water use that will maximize the sum of 
economic benefits from irrigated agriculture and hydropower generation in the Nile basin (i.e. 
the systems value of water generated from irrigation and hydropower). Figure 11 shows how the 
Nile system is represented in the NEOM. The water resources network is characterized as a 
series of nodes and links between these nodes. There are two kinds of nodes in the NEOM: 
reservoirs and irrigation schemes. The model includes all the existing reservoirs and irrigation 
schemes in the basin, as well as eight new reservoirs and 13 new irrigation schemes4. The links 
between nodes in the NEOM describe the physical characteristics of the Nile river along 
different stretches (e.g. the capacity of the channel and the net evaporation and seepage losses 
along each stretch). The Jonglei Canal is a special type of link because the user can specify 
whether or not it can be assumed that it will be built and the amount of water it can be assumed 
to be able to carry. 
The mathematical formulation of the NEOM can be expressed as: 
Subject to the following constraints: 
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, = the quantity of water withdrawal for irrigation at site i for country c in month t, 
ci
eP
, = the electricity price at site i for country c (in US$/kWh), 
ci
tKWH
,  = the hydropower generated at site i for country c in month t, 
i
tS  = reservoir storage for reservoir i in month t, 
i
tI  = the inflow to site i in month t, 
i
tR  = the release (or the outflow) from site i in month t, 
ij
tEV
  = the percentage of evaporation loss for water flowing from site j, where j indicates 
immediate nodes before site i and can be more than one, to site I, 
i
te  = the evaporation rate at site i in month t, 
i
tr  = the addition to flow at site i in month t owing from rainfall, 
ia and ib  = the constant and the slope of the area storage relation of the reservoir, respectively, 
i
MinS  and 
i
MaxS = the minimum and maximum storage for any reservoir at site I, 
ciQ ,  = the irrigation withdrawal for irrigation site i in October, 
i
t  = the coefficients of irrigation withdrawal for site i in month t in relation to irrigation 
withdrawal for  site i in October, 





t SSf   = function determining average productive head, 
  = hydropower efficiency and  
ciCAP ,  = the maximum hydropower that can be generated at site i in month t. 
The model uses a time increment of one month and solves for values of the decision 
variables itS (reservoir storage), 
i
tR (release for outflow), 
ci
tQ





t SSf   (average productive head) and 
ci
tKWH
, (amount of electricity generated) for a single 
year to determine the combination of monthly releases from a specified set of Nile hydropower 
generation facilities and the monthly abstractions at specified sets of irrigation schemes that will 
generate the greatest annual economic benefits to the riparian countries as a whole. The 
constraints require continuity at different nodes, storage capacity constraints, irrigation water 
withdrawal patterns, hydropower generation equalities, hydropower generation capacity 
constraints and non-negative constraints. 
This basic model formulation was first proposed by Thomas & Revelle (1966) for 
studying the operation of the Aswan High Dam. It was later extended by Guariso & Whittington 
(1987) to include reservoirs on the Ethiopia portion of the Blue Nile. The model presented above 
is the first time the formulation has been used to characterize the entire Nile Basin. The model is 
quickly solved on a personal computer using GAMS software. 
 The model can be used to evaluate the economic implications of different combinations 
of proposed Nile water control infrastructure that have been proposed by the riparian countries 
(Fig. 11). The user can specify the total amount of water available over the course of the model 
year (i.e. whether the water resources managers are attempting to operate the control structures 
during an average, high or low hydrological year). The user of the model can also constrain the 
optimization to ensure specific levels of water flow or withdrawals, for example, to meet basic 
needs, priorities or obligations at any point in the river system. Municipal and industrial water 
withdrawals can be specified for each riparian country and the model can be constrained so that 
these demands are always met. Environmental goals can also be incorporated in NEOM as 
constraints on system management. For example, minimum flows through the Sudd swamps can 
be required. NEOM can be used to examine the implications of not flooding portions of the Blue 
Nile gorge, or requiring minimum flows along different stretches of the river. The user can also 
prohibit the construction of specific environmentally sensitive projects. 
NEOM does not explicitly include the economic benefits of flood control. In the future, if 
most of the proposed control infrastructure is built, operating the Nile system to maximize the 
economic benefits from irrigation and hydropower generation should in fact solve flooding 
problems on the Blue and main Niles. The economic benefits of flood control are thus relevant 
for investment planning purposes in terms of ensuring that the economic benefits of proposed 
dams justify their costs. Once these control structures are completed, however, operating the 
system to achieve hydropower and irrigation objectives will indirectly ensure that flood damage 
is minimized because the seasonal variability of the Nile flow will be smoothed. The proposed 
reservoirs will be likely to be sufficiently large to store substantial amounts of the water from 
high floods for use during periods of low floods, mitigating the effects of floods and, to some 
extent, droughts. 
There are numerous other limitations of this model formulation. For example, neither 
water quality considerations nor sediment transport is incorporated, nor are groundwater flows 
incorporated explicitly in the model. The NEOM is deterministic and assumes that the managers 
of the system know the pattern of inflows throughout the basin over the coming year. Moreover, 
this is an annual model and does not address the complexity of over-year storage issues. 
Most importantly, the capital costs of the infrastructure development projects are not 
included. There are two contexts in which this admittedly extreme assumption might be relevant. 
The first is if international donors provided grant financing to build the proposed Nile 
infrastructure projects. Second, after such infrastructure is built, the capital represents sunk costs 
and from both an economic and social perspective should be operated to maximize economic 
benefits. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the results presented in this paper should 
not be viewed as an ex ante economic justification for the construction of infrastructure projects 
in the Nile basin. 
 We have confronted numerous data deficiencies and were forced to make many 
simplifications to formulate and solve this economic optimization model for the Nile Basin. 
However, from an economic perspective, the main problem is the lack of information on the 
demand functions for irrigation water in the different riparian countries. This is not a problem 
that will be solved easily or quickly because these user values of water are simply unknown 
today in the Nile Basin. It is also important to emphasize that such economic user values of water 
are not static. They will change over time in response to infrastructure investments and 
technological and climatic factors, as well as macroeconomic and sector policies in the riparian 
countries. 
To address this uncertainty in the user values of water in irrigated agriculture, our data 
analysis consisted of three steps. First, we have assumed an economic value of water in 
agriculture and a value of hydropower that are generally consistent with international experience 
(US$0.05/m
3
 in irrigated agriculture and US$0.08/kW-h) in well-run irrigation schemes and 
power systems. We have assumed that these user values are the same in all riparian countries in 
the Nile basin and that they are constant regardless of the amount of water withdrawn in a 
particular country (i.e. for this step of the analysis we have assumed perfectly horizontal demand 
curves for water in agriculture and hydropower.) We then used the NEOM to examine several 
scenarios with different assumptions about the water control projects in place in the basin and the 
locations and amounts of water withdrawals. Water withdrawals for several of the scenarios were 
constrained so that fixed amounts were withdrawn by each riparian, while water withdrawals in 
the final model run were unconstrained so that the model could determine where and how much 
water should be withdrawn to maximize total economic benefits (systems values). We then 
compared (a) the scenarios in which the results were constrained by fixed water withdrawals, to 
(b) the scenario in which water withdrawals were unconstrained (i.e. in which water was free to 
be allocated to the highest value uses). This approach allowed us to examine the economic 
implications of different patterns of water withdrawal for irrigation. 
 Second, we conducted sensitivity analysis by varying the user value of water in irrigated 
agriculture. We evaluated how the economic value of cooperation would change for different 
user values of water for irrigation, still maintaining the assumption that the user value for the 
water in irrigation would be the same across different riparian countries. 
Third, we relaxed the assumption that different riparian countries had the same user value 
of water in irrigation and allowed this value to differ across countries. Starting from the baseline 
case for which the user value of water in irrigation was assumed to be US$0.05/m
3
 for both 
upstream and downstream riparian countries, we evaluated four cases for which a group of 
countries (upstream or downstream riparian countries) would have high or low user value of 
water for irrigation while the user value of water in irrigation for the rest of the riparian countries 
(downstream or upstream riparian countries) remains at US$ 0.05/m
3
: (1) high user value for 
water in irrigation for upstream riparian countries (Ethiopia and Equatorial states), (2) low value 
for upstream riparian countries, (3) high value for downstream riparian countries (Sudan and 
Egypt) and (4) low value for downstream riparian countries. 
The next section of this paper presents the results of the analyses for each of these three 
steps for dealing with the uncertainty in user values. 
Results 
In order to determine the economic value of cooperation, we first calculate the total 
economic benefits under two cases: the status quo conditions and full cooperation. Under the 
status quo situation, no proposed infrastructure is built and irrigation water is allocated to 
individual riparian countries in approximately the current allocation pattern. We define 
“cooperative full development” as the state of the world in which all proposed infrastructure 
projects (i.e. Blue Nile reservoirs, wetland conservation projects and White Nile power projects 
currently under consideration by the riparians) will be completed and operated to optimize the 
total economic benefits for the whole basin. We judge that it would be impossible to build the 
full set of Nile infrastructure projects under discussion and to operate them to maximize 
economic benefits without full cooperation among the riparians. On the other hand, the Nile 
riparians could cooperate fully in the construction and operation of a lesser number of 
infrastructure projects; we term this state of the world “cooperative partial development”. On the 
other hand, a smaller number of infrastructure projects might result from less than full 
cooperation, that is, coalitions among some subset of Nile riparians. 
Table 2 presents the comparison between the status quo and cooperative full development 
(assuming the value water for irrigation is US$0.05/m
3
 and the value for hydropower is 
$0.08/kW-h). The difference between the total economic benefits between the status quo and 
cooperative full development can be interpreted as the economic value of cooperation5. Table 2 
                                                 
5 Some specific characteristics of these investment projects justify our use of the term “economic value of 
cooperation” here. The idea of building these investment projects is not new; in fact many projects discussed here 
shows that the economic value of cooperation is US$4.94 billion (10
9
) annually, more than the 
total economic benefits realized at present for the status quo conditions for the whole basin. In 
terms of the average economic value per cubic metre, the economic value of water will increase 
from 0.04 per m
3
 (including both irrigation and hydropower benefits) to 0.09 per m
3
 due to 
cooperative full development. 
While cooperative full development in the Nile basin would create significant economic 
benefits compared to the status quo, this is only one of many possible scenarios for the future 
Nile development. We thus consider four additional scenarios in our analysis. These scenarios 
are defined based on the status of capital investment projects that are completed. A brief 
description for each scenario is given in Table 3, including the status quo (Scenario 1) and 
cooperative full development (Scenario 6). Scenarios 2 to 5 represent situations in which only 
some of the currently proposed infrastructure projects are completed. These may be envisaged as 
partial cooperation solutions, or alternatively as steps on the path to full cooperation (where 
investment is constrained by either a lack of capital for investment or a lack of political 
agreement about which projects to construct). Scenario 2 represents the partial cooperative 
development of hydropower potential in the Blue Nile (only Lake Tana, Mobil Dam and Border 
Dam are assumed to be built). Scenario 3 represents the full development on the Blue Nile (all 
five proposed dams in Ethiopia are assumed to be built) and Scenario 4 represents the full 
development on the Blue Nile plus the completion of the wetland projects on the White Nile. 
                                                                                                                                                             
are little different from the Century Storage Project proposed by H.E. Hurst more than half a century ago. The 
primary reason for lack of progress in putting these investment projects in place has been lack of cooperation among 
the Nile riparian countries. Some countries where it is proposed that these projects be built have not had the 
financial means to take on these investment projects on their own and owing to the potential objection of 
downstream countries, the financing of these projects has been complicated. [Such a situation is likely to continue 
unless the Nile riparian countries can agree to cooperative schemes that will allow riparians jointly to harness the 
potential of these investment projects, either individuals or through joint partnership arrangements. 
Scenario 5 represents the full development in the White Nile (demolition of Jebel Aulia dam and 
the construction of the While Nile reservoirs and power stations and wetland projects) plus 
partial development on the Blue Nile (only Lake Tana, Mobil Dam and Border Dam are assumed 
to be built). 
For each scenario of these six scenarios, we consider two cases: (1) fixed amounts of 
water withdrawals for individual riparian countries and (2) no constraints on water withdrawals 
in a particular country. Two factors are taken into consideration in establishing water withdrawal 
constraints in our analysis. The first is current use patterns which reflect the 1959 Nile Waters 
Agreement between Egypt and Sudan. The second is the aspiration of the upstream riparian 
countries to utilize Nile water for development of irrigation schemes. We assume that Ethiopia 
would eventually utilize 10 billion m
3
 of water from the Nile basin for irrigation purposes 
(Whittington et al., 1994) and that the equatorial states would use at least 2 billion m
3
 of water 
annually. 
It is, in fact, impossible to know what water withdrawal targets would “satisfy” all 
riparian countries and moreover it must be assumed that desired withdrawals will change over 
time. The specific water withdrawal constraints used in these analyses are thus somewhat 
arbitrary and are used only for purposes of illustration. Our main objective is to demonstrate that 
imposing water withdrawal targets can be quite costly from an economic perspective. 
The economic value of cooperation on the Blue Nile can be seen by comparing Scenarios 
2 and 3 with Scenario 1 (status quo). Under the scenario of limited infrastructure development on 
the Blue Nile, the annual economic value of cooperation is between US$1.15 billion and 
US$1.97 billion (Tables 4 and 5), depending on whether or not the water withdrawal targets are 
imposed. In the case where all Blue Nile development projects are built (Scenario 3), such 
benefits increase to between US$2.76 billion and US$3.63 billion annually. The economic value 
of cooperation on the Blue Nile derives mainly from two sources: (1) economic benefits from 
additional hydropower production from Blue Nile hydropower stations and (2) water savings 
from shifting storage from the Aswan High Dam Reservoir to these Blue Nile reservoirs. The 
sizable difference in economic benefits between the case for which water withdrawal targets are 
imposed and the case for which such constraints are removed indicates that imposing water 
withdrawal targets is not efficient from an economic perspective. Under our assumptions, about 
US$800 million would be lost annually if these water withdrawal targets were imposed. 
The economic benefits of wetland projects are shown in Scenario 46. If no water 
withdrawal constraints are imposed, the incremental benefits of adding the wetland project to the 
infrastructure system, given the assumed values for irrigation (US$ 0.05/m
3
) and hydropower 
(US$0.08/kW-h), are quite small (about US$100 million annually). The marginal benefits of the 
wetland project, however, increase dramatically when water withdrawal targets are imposed 
(Table 4). Without the water savings from the wetland project, it is impossible to meet the water 
withdrawal targets for upstream riparian countries while not compromising the irrigation water 
withdrawal targets of Sudan and Egypt. 
Tables 4 and 5 also show the economic value of cooperation on the White Nile. The 
difference between the Scenario 2 and Scenario 5 is that in the latter the White Nile power 
stations are added (along with the wetland project). Without the White Nile power stations, the 
NEOM suggests that water from Lake Victoria basin can be best utilized by the equatorial states, 
even if the wetland project is completed (Scenario 4). With the White Nile power stations, the 
                                                 
6 By wetland projects, we refer here to the Jonglei and the Machar Marshes projects, which could be operated to 
preserve the majority of the current wetlands. 
model allocates most of the White Nile flows from Lake Victoria to the downstream countries. 
The hydropower power facilities along the White Nile effectively tip the balance in favor of 
downstream users. Egypt is thus a major beneficiary of the construction of the White Nile power 
stations because once water passes through the White Nile power stations, the NEOM indicates 
that the best strategy is for it to continue on to the Aswan High Dam Reservoir in order to 
capture the hydropower and irrigation benefits in Egypt. From the Egyptian perspective, a 
strategy for alleviating concerns over potential irrigation withdrawals in the equatorial states 
might thus be to assist these countries in the expansion of their hydropower facilities. 
Figure 12 shows how the total economic benefits would increase when the level of 
cooperation (infrastructure development) increases. The level of cooperation can be interpreted 
as either (a) more riparian countries are brought into cooperative development schemes, or (b) 
more capital investment projects are added to the system, or (c) both. The effects of imposing 
country-level water withdrawal constraints are also shown in Fig. 12. Except for the case of full 
cooperation, imposing water withdrawal constraints will significantly reduce the economic 
benefits of cooperation. In fact, the economic savings in removing water withdrawal constraints 
for the case of full cooperation in the Blue Nile exceeds the marginal benefits of building a 
wetland project – even without taking into consideration the capital costs and negative 
environmental impact associated with the wetland project. 
Tables 6 and 7 present the results from the sensitivity analyses, varying the value of 
irrigation water. If the economic value of water for irrigation is reduced to US$0.02/m
3
, the 
NEOM allocates all of the irrigation water to Egypt because it is preferable to withdraw 
irrigation water after the hydropower benefits of release from the Aswan High Dam are realized 
instead of irrigating upstream and losing out on these hydropower benefits. The second economic 
pressure – “withdraw water for irrigation as far downstream as possible” – has clearly dictated 
the model results here. The model allocates more water to Sudan as the economic value of water 
for irrigation increases. When the economic value of water for irrigation increases to 
US$0.08/m
3
, it is better to withdraw water before the Aswan High Dam because the gains of 
additional hydropower generated at Aswan High Dam cannot offset the losses from evaporation. 
Table 6 also shows that, if the value of water for irrigation is the same across different 
riparian countries, it is not justified from the systems point of view to allocate any water for 
upstream riparian countries for irrigation purposes within the range of economic value of 
irrigation water assumed for this sensitivity analysis (US$ 0.02/m
3
 to US$ 0.08/m
3
). The model 
would allocate water to upstream riparian countries if the economic value of water for irrigation 
in these countries is much higher than that in the downstream riparian countries (Table 7). The 
fourth economic pressure – “Withdraw water where its user value is greatest” – prevails only 
when the difference in user values is very large. An interesting finding is that the economic value 
of cooperation is surprisingly robust to the variations in the user value of water for irrigation. 
The economic value of cooperation fluctuates in a relatively narrow range (from US$ 4.7 billion 
to US$ 5.5 billion annually) when the value of water for irrigation in various riparian countries 




. These results suggest that the managers of an 
integrated Nile system could adapt to different economic values of water for irrigation by putting 
more or less emphasis on hydropower generation. For example, more electricity will be 
generated if the value of water for irrigation is relatively low and emphasis will be shifted to 
reduce evaporation losses. In addition, much of the value of cooperation is from the hydropower 
generation associated with the assumed infrastructure projects in the Blue Nile and White Niles. 
Thus the bulk of the value for cooperation will not change if the economic value for hydropower 
is assumed to be fixed. 
Discussion 
 Table 8 summarizes 13 key results of the model analyses. Total (potential) annual direct 
gross economic benefits of Nile water utilization in irrigation and hydroelectric power generation 
are on the order of US$7–11 billion. Again, this does not account for the costs of building or 
operating the infrastructure and thus may strike some observers as a relatively small number. 
However, for policymakers in countries with gross domestic products per capita of less than 
US$300, it is likely to appear quite large. Moreover, there is a strong likelihood that the global 
community will pay for much of the financial costs of this infrastructure, so that the direct 
economic benefits could be largely captured by the people in the Nile Basin (Song & 
Whittington, 2004).  Finally, it is anticipated that these cooperative investments will yield 
significant indirect benefits and leverage opportunities “beyond the river” for greater regional 
integration and cooperation (Sadoff and Grey, 2002).  
In most scenarios the total direct economic benefits are generated “relatively” evenly in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt and the Equatorial States. This result is likely to surprise many 
policymakers and analysts in the Nile basin, who often fear that benefits will accrue unequally 
among the riparian countries. How these benefits are shared will need to be determined by 
negotiation7. However, the economically efficient location of water use can be strongly affected 
by which Nile riparian countries have the best set of macroeconomic and sector policies in place. 
                                                 
7 Hydropower facilities could be owned and operated by consortia of riparian countries as is currently the case in the 
Senegal River Basin. –[This probably isn’t ready for primetime.] Other potential negotiated benefit sharing 
arrangements could involve government or private sector riparian power purchase arrangements, power 
interconnection infrastructure and wheeling arrangements, agricultural investment by riparian private sector entities 
across the basin, or the bundling of other apparently unrelated investments such as rail or telecom interconnections 
(Waterbury & Whittington, 1998; Waterbury, 2002). 
Macroeconomic and sector policies will be primary determinants of the value of water in 
irrigation and the value of kilowatt hours of electricity. Inter-country power grids will enable 
electricity producers to obtain maximum prices, increasing the value of water in hydropower 
generation. These results are again likely to surprise many people in the basin, who often expect 
such natural advantages as soil type and precipitation to dominate policy variables. 
Although total economic benefits would be generated relatively equally in Egypt, Sudan, 
Ethiopia and the Equatorial States, the composition of the benefits differs by county. If large-
scale infrastructure development in the Nile basin is undertaken, the majority of the economic 
benefits from hydroelectric power generation will be generated in Ethiopia and to a lesser extent 
in Uganda. Power interconnections will increase the magnitude of these benefits. On the other 
hand, the majority of the irrigation benefits are generated in Sudan and Egypt. If the economic 
value of water in irrigation were the same in Ethiopia, Uganda, Egypt and Sudan, from a system-
wide perspective the economically efficient management solution would be to use water for 
irrigation in downstream riparian countries. But low crop water requirements in the Ethiopian 
highlands may increase the economic value of water in irrigation. 
If the economic value of water in irrigation is the same throughout the Nile basin, the 
model does not promote water use for irrigation in the highlands region of Ethiopia. This is 
because it wants to capture the hydroelectric power generation along the Blue Nile gorge. 
Abstracting irrigation water in the Ethiopian highlands upstream of the proposed Blue Nile 
reservoirs results in significant losses in hydroelectric power generation. The more economically 
valuable a kilowatt-hour of electricity from hydropower, the higher the economic penalty of 
withdrawing water for irrigation in the Ethiopian highlands and the greater the system-wide 
benefits of downstream riparians using water for irrigation purposes downstream of power 
generation. This “within-country” tradeoff between hydropower generation and irrigation is not 
limited to Ethiopia. Uganda, Sudan and Egypt also confront this tradeoff. 
The economic benefits of irrigation to Ethiopia are likely to be greater near the border 
with Sudan, in the west of the country, because such water supplies have already generated 
substantial hydropower benefits. Once water flows through the Ethiopian highlands and the 
hydroelectric power potential there is captured, it does not matter much whether the water is 
withdrawn for irrigation in Sudan, Egypt, or the lowlands of Ethiopia (except that the model does 
not want to withdraw water directly above hydropower facilities). 
Finally, most of the projects on each Nile riparian country’s drawing boards have been 
designed only from the perspective of a single riparian country, not from a basin-wide 
perspective. A suboptimal outcome of the NBI would be if the result of the riparians’ 
negotiations was that every riparian got their “own” unilaterally-designed projects approved. 
This could lead to conflicts down the road over the operation of the infrastructure because there 
are simply too many projects on the drawing boards for them all to make economic sense.  
Furthermore such unilaterally designed projects will fail to capture the greater gains afforded by 
system-wide management and development. 
Whatever the eventual level of infrastructure development in the Nile basin, the NBI has 
set in motion an historic shift from unilateral investment planning to a focus on cooperative 
system-wide development and management of Nile waters. This new perspective should enable 
the riparians better to sustain the ecosystem and generate greater economic benefits for all people 
in the Nile basin. The direct economic value of cooperation will be substantial and if cooperation 
on the Nile can be achieved, it will catalyze other development gains throughout the region. 
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Fig. 7. Economic value of hydropower generated by a cubic metre of water flowing through the 























Fig. 8. Cumulative economic value of hydropower generated by a cubic metre of water flowing 



















Fig. 9. Economic value of hydropower generated by a cubic metre of water flowing through the 

















Fig. 10. Cumulative economic value of hydropower generated by a cubic metre of water flowing 





















Fig. 11. Schematic diagram of the Nile Basin. 





































Table 1. Potential development projects in the Nile Basin. 
Project Hydropower 
production (installed 







Blue Nile storage projects (Lake 
Tana, Karodobi Dam, Mabil Dam, 
Mendaia Dam and Border Dam) 
 
5700 MW 4 
White and main Nile 
Wetland projects (Jonglei I and II, 
Machar Marshes and Gahzal projects) 
– 11 
Demolition of Jebel Aulia dam – 3 
White Nile reservoirs (Lake Albert 
and Lake Kioga) 
– – 
White Nile hydropower stations 
(Owen Falls Dam, Bujagali, 
Kalugala, Kamdinj, Ayoga South, 
Ajoga North and Murcison) 
2300 MW – 
 Table 2. Economic value of cooperation: status quo versus full cooperation. 






 Total economic value (millions of US$) 
Ethiopia 50 3010 
4943 
Sudan 723 513 
Egypt 3204 4313 
Others 186 1272 
Total 4164 9107 
 
 Table 3. Description of scenarios. 
  Blue Nile projects 
Wetland projects (Jonglei, 
Machar, Ghazal) 
White Nile projects (White 
Nile reservoirs and power 
stations and demolition of 
Jebel Aulia dam) 
Scenario 1: 
status quo 
No No No 
Scenario 2 LakeTana/Mabil/Border No No 
Scenario 3 Full development No No 
Scenario 4 Full development Yes No 
Scenario 5 LakeTana/Mabil/Border Yes Yes 
Scenario 6: full 
cooperation 
Full development Yes Yes 
 
Table 4. Scenario analysis: economic value of cooperation with water withdrawal constraints. 
Scenario  1 Scenario  2 Scenario  3 Scenario  4 Scenario  5 Scenario  6
Water Allocation (BCM)
Ethiopia 1.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
Sudan 12.00 15.00 15.00 17.00 17.00 17.00
Egypt 54.00 45.00 45.00 53.00 54.75 54.60
Others 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Total 69.00 72.00 72.00 82.00 83.75 83.60
Hydropower Generated (GWH)
Ethiopia 0 14,948 35,299 35,129 14,812 35,399
Sudan 1,543 1,572 1,902 1,990 2,382 2,448
Egypt 6,303 3,951 3,345 1,327 5,788 5,761
Others 1,074 963 963 860 15,533 15,533
Total 8,920 21,434 41,509 39,307 38,514 59,141
Total Economic Value (Millions 
of US$)
Ethiopia $50 $1,696 $3,324 $3,310 $1,685 $3,332
Sudan $723 $876 $902 $1,009 $1,041 $1,046
Egypt $3,204 $2,566 $2,518 $2,756 $3,201 $3,191
Others $186 $177 $177 $169 $1,343 $1,343
Total $4,164 $5,315 $6,921 $7,245 $7,269 $8,911
Economic Value of Cooperation 
(Millions of US$) $1,151 $2,757 $3,081 $3,105 $4,748  
Table 5. Scenario analysis: economic value of cooperation without water withdrawal constraints. 
Scenario  1 Scenario  2 Scenario  3 Scenario  4 Scenario  5 Scenario  6
Water Allocation (BCM)
Ethiopia 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sudan 12.00 22.67 30.01 30.01 3.85 6.34
Egypt 54.00 38.27 31.90 33.85 76.11 73.91
Others 2.00 23.77 23.77 23.77 0.00 0.00
Total 69.00 84.71 85.68 87.63 79.97 80.26
Hydropower Generated (GWH)
Ethiopia 0 16,814 37,687 37,687 16,813 37,619
Sudan 1,543 2,457 2,457 2,457 2,448 2,448
Egypt 6,303 4,250 3,596 3,789 7,957 7,714
Others 1,074 156 156 156 15,895 15,895
Total 8,920 23,677 43,896 44,089 43,113 63,676
Total Economic Value       
(Millions of US$)
Ethiopia $50 $1,345 $3,015 $3,015 $1,345 $3,010
Sudan $723 $1,330 $1,697 $1,697 $388 $513
Egypt $3,204 $2,253 $1,883 $1,996 $4,442 $4,313
Others $186 $1,201 $1,201 $1,201 $1,272 $1,272
Total $4,164 $6,130 $7,796 $7,908 $7,447 $9,107
Economic Value of Cooperation 
(Millions of US$) $1,966 $3,632 $3,745 $3,284 $4,943
 Table 6. Sensitivity analyses for variation in economic value of water for irrigation (assuming 
the value for irrigation is the same across different riparian countries). 
 
Status quo Full cooperation Status quo Full cooperation Status quo Full cooperation
Water Allocation (BCM)
Ethiopia 1 0 1 0 1 0
Sudan 12 0 12 6 12 71
Egypt 54 69 54 74 54 17
Others 2 0 2 0 2 0
Total 69 69 69 80 69 88
Hydropower Generated (GWH)
Ethiopia 0 37,687 0 37,619 0 37,568
Sudan 1,543 2,467 1,543 2,448 1,543 2,422
Egypt 6,303 12,559 6,303 7,714 6,303 2,134
Others 1,074 15,895 1,074 15,895 1,074 15,895
Total 8,920 68,608 8,920 63,676 8,920 58,019
Total Economic Value       
(Millions of US$)
Ethiopia $20 $3,015 $50 $3,010 $80 $3,005
Sudan $363 $197 $723 $513 $1,083 $5,858
Egypt $1,584 $2,382 $3,204 $4,313 $4,824 $1,532
Others $126 $1,272 $186 $1,272 $246 $1,272
Total $2,094 $6,866 $4,164 $9,107 $6,234 $11,666
Economic Value of Cooperation 
(Millions of US$) $4,773 $4,943 $5,433
Low value of water for irrigation: 
US$ 0.02/m
3
Median value of water for 
irrigation: US$ 0.05/m
3










 Table 7. Sensitivity analyses for variation in economic value of water for irrigation (assuming 
the value for irrigation can differ across riparian countries). 
 
Status quo Full cooperation Status quo Full cooperation Status quo Full cooperation Status quo Full cooperation
Water Allocation (BCM)
Ethiopia 1 0 1 38 1 36 1 0
Sudan 12 6 12 4 12 0 12 71
Egypt 54 74 54 38 54 43 54 17
Others 2 0 2 8 2 6 2 0
Total 69 80 69 87 69 85 69 88
Hydropower Generated (GWH)
Ethiopia 0 37,687 0 29,435 0 29,863 0 37,630
Sudan 1,543 2,448 1,543 758 1,543 889 1,543 2,418
Egypt 6,303 7,709 6,303 4,220 6,303 4,984 6,303 2,134
Others 1,074 15,895 1,074 13,969 1,074 14,643 1,074 15,895
Total 8,920 63,738 8,920 48,383 8,920 50,379 8,920 58,078
Total Economic Value       
(Millions of US$)
Ethiopia $20 $3,015 $80 $5,357 $50 $4,193 $50 $3,010
Sudan $723 $515 $723 $253 $363 $71 $1,083 $5,857
Egypt $3,204 $4,311 $3,204 $2,243 $1,584 $1,260 $4,824 $1,531
Others $126 $1,272 $246 $1,746 $186 $1,474 $186 $1,272
Total $4,074 $9,112 $4,254 $9,599 $2,184 $6,997 $6,144 $11,670
Economic Value of Cooperation 
(Millions of US$) $5,039 $5,346 $4,814 $5,526
Low value of water for irrigation 
for upstream riparian countries: 
US$ 0.02/m
3
High value of water for irrigation 
for upstream riparian countries: 
US$ 0.08/m
3
Low value of water for irrigation 
for downstream riparian 
countries: US$ 0.02/m
3
High value of water for irrigation 













Table 8. Summary of model results: thirteen observations. 
No. NEOM results/observations 
1 Total (potential) annual direct economic benefits of Nile water utilization in irrigation 
and hydroelectric power generation are on the order of US$7–11 billion (this does not 
account for the costs of building or operating the infrastructure). 
2 In most scenarios, total direct economic benefits are generated “relatively” evenly in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt and the Equatorial States. How these benefits are shared will 
need to be determined by negotiation. 
3 The economically efficient location of water use will primarily depend on which Nile 
riparian countries have the best set of macroeconomic and sector policies in place. 
4 Macroeconomic and sector policies will be primary determinants of the value of water 
in irrigation and, to a lesser extent, the value of kilowatt hours of electricity. Inter-
country power grids will enable electricity producers to obtain maximum prices, 
increasing the value of water in hydropower generation. 
5 With large-scale infrastructure development, the majority of the economic benefits 
from hydroelectric power generation are generated in Ethiopia and to a lesser extent in 
Uganda; power interconnections will increase these benefits. 
6 With large-scale infrastructure development, the majority of the irrigation benefits are 
generated in Sudan and Egypt. 
7 If the economic value of water in irrigation were the same in Ethiopia, Uganda, Egypt 
and Sudan, from a system-wide perspective the economically efficient management 
solution would be to use water for irrigation in downstream riparian countries. But low 
crop water requirements in the Ethiopian highlands may increase the economic value 
of water in irrigation. 
8 Abstracting irrigation water in the Ethiopian highlands upstream of the proposed Blue 
Nile reservoirs results in significant losses in hydroelectric power generation. The 
model does not promote water use for irrigation in the highlands region of Ethiopia if 
the value of water in irrigation is the same throughout the Nile basin (but this may not 
be the case). This is because it wants to capture the hydroelectric power generation 
along the Blue Nile gorge. 
9 The economic benefits of irrigation to Ethiopia are likely to be greater near the border 
with Sudan, in the west of the country, because such water supplies have already 
generated substantial hydropower benefits. 
10 The within-country tradeoff between hydropower generation and irrigation is not 
limited to Ethiopia. Uganda, Sudan and Egypt also confront this tradeoff.  
11 The more economically valuable is a kilowatt-hour of electricity from hydropower, the 
higher the economic penalty of withdrawing water for irrigation in the Ethiopian 
highlands and the greater the system-wide benefits of downstream riparians using 
water for irrigation purposes downstream of power generation. 
12 Once you get water through the Ethiopian highlands and capture the hydroelectric 
power potential there, it does not matter much whether you use the water for irrigation 
in Sudan, Egypt, or the lowlands of Ethiopia (except you do not want to withdraw 
water directly above hydropower facilities). 
13 Most of the projects on each country’s drawing boards have been designed from the 
country’s perspective only, not from a basin-wide perspective. A suboptimal outcome 
of the Nile Basin Initiative would be if the result of the riparians’ negotiations was that 
every riparian got their “own” unilaterally designed projects approved. This could lead 
to conflicts down the road over the operation of the infrastructure. There are too many 
projects on the drawing board for them all to make economic sense.  Furthermore such 
unilaterally designed projects will fail to capture the greater gains afforded by system-
wide management and development. 
 
 
